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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The energy sector is facing major challenges in most of its activities and segments. The 
main challenges are related to the mitigation of climate change, increasing efficiency 
and to guaranteeing energy security. Many recent reports and papers (Anadon et al. 
2011; Nakicenovic and Nordhaus, 2011; OECD, 2011; Anadon, 2012; IEA, 2012) have 
stressed that fostering innovation is crucial to meeting these challenges. Nevertheless, 
the level of R&D investment and innovation in the energy industry remains quite low in 
comparison with other sectors (GEA, 2012).  
 
Many papers have analysed the R&D determinants and the barriers that firms face in the 
manufacturing sector (Griffith et al., 2006; Savignac, 2008; Cohen, 2010). In addition 
some recent papers have examined the effects of the liberalisation and restructuring of 
the electricity markets on R&D investments (Jamasb and Pollit, 2008; Sanyal and 
Cohen, 2009; Kim et al., 2012).  
 
Nevertheless, our knowledge of the reasons that explain R&D and innovation in this 
sector remains scant. The lack of data on R&D activities in the energy industry has 
made R&D determinants and innovative behaviour in this sector difficult to analyse 
(Jamasb and Pollit, 2008; European Commission, 2009a; Anadon et al., 2011; Gallagher 
et al., 2012). Therefore, very few papers have examined the R&D drivers for the energy 
industry (Salies, 2010; Kim et al., 2012; Sterlacchini, 2012) and, to our knowledge, the 
effect of the whole set of obstacles to innovation in the energy industry has not been 
empirically analysed.  
 
The analysis is carried out for energy supply utilities and distinguishes on the one hand 
those factors influencing the decision about whether to do R&D or not, and on the other, 
those that affect the relative amount of resources devoted to R&D. In addition, the 
effects of financial barriers and other obstacles to innovation are examined. In 
particular, we analyse how the existence of dominant incumbents is affecting 
innovation. Therefore, the main research questions of this paper are to examine why 
R&D investment and innovation levels in the energy industry are so low in comparison 
with other sectors and in what way the peculiarities of the energy industry may be 
influencing its innovative behaviour.  
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Innovation in the energy industry may be driven by some specific forces and face 
specific barriers related to the characteristics of the innovation activities in this industry. 
Some of the characteristics that may affect the innovative behaviour of the firms and the 
low level of R&D investment in this sector are the large scale of the R&D projects, the 
dominance of existing technologies, preference for incremental innovations or the 
greater size of the firms in this sector that may allow them to overcome financial 
barriers more easily than firms in other sectors. The identification of the R&D drivers 
and the factors that hamper innovation in the energy industry has significant policy 
implications that are important for the design of adequate instruments to incentivize 
R&D investment in this sector. 
 
The analysis of the drivers that explain business investments in R&D and the obstacles 
to innovation in the energy industry is carried out taking into account the current 
competitive situation after the liberalisation reforms. Recent literature shows that there 
has been a significant reduction in the R&D expenditure of energy firms and that the 
R&D strategies of firms are more oriented towards increasing efficiency and to short-
term objectives (Sterlacchini, 2012). Competition compels firms to provide electricity 
fulfilling quality and efficiency requirements and the R&D and the innovation effort is 
related to the realisation of profits and oriented to market objectives.  
 
After this introduction, the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a 
brief discussion of the main characteristics and peculiarities of R&D and innovation 
activities in the energy industry. The third section describes the database, presents the 
specification of the model and explains the variables used. The fourth section discusses 
the econometric estimation and presents the estimation results. The paper ends with a 
concluding section which also presents policy implications and proposals for future 
research. 
 
 
2. R&D AND INNOVATION IN THE ENERGY INDUSTRY 
 
The energy industry, despite its importance in the economy, has traditionally shown a 
low level of expenditure on R&D. Moreover, with the liberalisation process started in 
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the early 1990s there has been a decrease in R&D investments, both in the United States 
and in the majority of European countries. In addition, this process has brought with it 
profound changes in the energy industry that have affected the drivers of R&D and the 
barriers to innovation and, therefore, the R&D investment decisions of firms. The 
liberalization process in the energy sector was designed to create a new institutional 
framework to benefit consumers and foster welfare. In a competitive environment, 
energy is offered in conditions of cost and quality efficiency and these attributes are 
transferred to the consumer through prices. As Joskow (2008) argues, these benefits can 
be realized by relying on competitive wholesale markets for power to provide better 
incentives for controlling the construction and operating costs of new and existing 
generating capacity, to encourage innovation in power supply technologies and to 
provide incentives for network operators to deliver appropriate levels of service quality. 
With retail competition, suppliers are expected to offer an enhanced array of retail 
service products, risk management, demand management, and new opportunities for 
service quality differentiation to better match individual consumer preferences.  
 
Under competitive market conditions utilities should reduce costs and adapt to demand. 
In such a framework, energy firms adopt new competitive strategies focused on 
efficiency in processes to reduce costs and increase margins, on the one hand, and on 
differentiation in contracts, on the other, given that energy is a homogenous product 
(Jamasb and Pollit, 2008). Apparently the only effective competitive differentiation 
strategies are those based on the type of contract, whether it is on the wholesale market 
or on the retail market (Salies, 2010). The R&D and innovation projects that take a long 
time to mature are displaced by those with rapid implementation and returns. In 
addition, the low growth rate of demand for electricity in OECD countries (IEA, 2012) 
also forces utilities to give up long-term projects (Jamasb and Pollit, 2008; Salies, 
2010). This change in R&D partially explains the lower volumes of investment in the 
energy sector under competition (Jamasb and Pollit, 2008, Starlacchini, 2012). More 
importantly, the liberalisation process may have modified the structure of incentives 
faced by energy firms. Consequently, the level and composition of their R&D 
expenditures may have been changed both as a response to the new market conditions 
and to the increased uncertainties imposed by greater competitive pressure. 
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However, there are some forces that may also foster R&D. Sanyal and Cohen (2009) list 
the following. First, R&D expenditure increases the firm’s absorptive capacity, hence 
contributing to more efficient R&D projects in the future and to the ability to enjoy 
benefits from spillovers derived from R&D expenditure by competing firms and even 
firms in other sectors. Second, firms may conduct research on several technology 
options and thus increase the research budget. Third, R&D could be a substitute for 
ordinary investment if it places the firm in a position to invest more rapidly in new 
technology once the optimal investment strategy is revealed. Finally, in a competitive 
environment firms will face a situation of relatively more elastic demand, in which the 
firm knows that a small technological success –and a small price decrease- can 
represent a large number of new customers. 
 
The market-based model implemented necessarily leads to short-term objectives. In a 
context in which the new regulatory framework does not allow the recovery of the total 
costs of long-term R&D; firms will change their objectives and reduce the volume of 
investment (Sterlacchini, 2012). In competitive conditions utilities try to maximise their 
profits and increase their market value at the expense of investments with sunk costs or 
with very long-term returns, such as R&D. Sanyal and Ghosh (2012) calculate that the 
negative impact of competition on innovation more than compensates for the positive 
impact derived from the appropriability effect. 
 
Technology and innovation in the energy sector show some peculiarities that make them 
different vis-à-vis other sectors in the economy. Market failures related with R&D 
activities are more intense in the energy sector. Indivisibility, spillovers and uncertainty 
affect energy R&D in a significant way (Jamasb and Pollit, 2008). Salies (2010) argues 
that the main cause of the decline of R&D in the sector is increased uncertainty that 
mostly affects investment decisions, an argument raised previously by Dooley (1998). 
Similarly, the close relationship with the environment explains why investments in 
R&D in the energy sector produce greater positive externalities than other activities. 
The existence of spillovers creates problems of appropriability and reduces private 
incentives for investment (Salies and Nesta, 2010, Salies, 2010; Kim et al., 2012).  
 
The characteristics of competitive energy industries have effects on R&D investments. 
First, the process of total or partial privatisation has meant the practical disappearance 
5
 
 
of the old public monopolies. Part of the literature argues that the model of ownership is 
a significant variable in understanding the causes of the fall in R&D. Sterlacchini 
(2012) states that in a competitive environment public ownership maintains higher 
expenditure on R&D since privately owned firms are not able to charge higher prices to 
recoup their R&D investments. However, Kim et al. (2012) argue that private 
ownership does not by itself explain the fall in R&D. According to these authors, only 
when private ownership operates in a liberalised market does privatisation have 
negative effects on R&D. This supposed interaction between liberalisation and 
privatisation leads the authors to an implicit defence of private monopolies and the 
debateable benefits for R&D of the appropriation of monopoly rents. On the contrary it 
can be argued that public ownership, and especially under monopoly conditions, could 
provide inefficient R&D financing. The Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis (CPB) questions the interpretation of the literature on the evolution of R&D 
pointing out that, before reform, investment in innovation was inefficient and enjoyed 
an abundance of resources that were not justified by the objectives achieved. Less R&D 
is not necessarily the same as a lower degree of dynamic efficiency (Mulder et al., 
2006). 
 
Second, the average size of firms is now smaller. This reduction in size is due to 
unbundling and to the inclusion, in competitive conditions, of new entrants into the 
wholesale and retail markets. Moreover, the adoption of new technologies for 
generation has reduced the average size of businesses. Theory generally shows that size 
is a barrier to entry for R&D (Cohen, 2010). In the case of the energy sector this barrier 
is more evident as the structure of the market is still very concentrated (Acs and 
Audretsch, 1987). Sanyal (2007), Sanyal and Cohen (2009), Salies (2010) and Kim et 
al. (2012) argue that the size of energy firms affects decisions on R&D and the 
objectives of the projects and find support for the Schumpeterian hypothesis, 
demonstrating that size positively affects R&D expenditure. In the literature, the only 
exception is Sterlacchini (2012), who does not obtain significant results for the size 
variable. Scale appears generally to be associated with the availability of funds for the 
financing of R&D projects. Bigger firms have greater resources available and make 
more investments in R&D (Sanyal, 2007), even if this association is not maintained 
when intensity is considered. 
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The entry of new agents into the energy industries, characterised by the use of low-
emission technologies, has furthered a change in the composition and volume of R&D. 
This change is mainly associated with the technology mix, which in turn depends 
heavily on energy policies. Hydraulic energy is related to the development of innovation 
and the R&D of renewable energies whereas nuclear and fossil energies act as barriers 
to entry for radical innovations (Markard and Truffer, 2006; Salies, 2010). In other 
words, the technology mix can deter entry when incumbent utilities concentrate their 
portfolio on nuclear and fossil technologies. A competitive environment can, thus, have 
asymmetric effects on innovation by incentivising projects based on renewable and 
environment-friendly energy while penalising nuclear and fossil energies (Salies and 
Nesta, 2010). In such a context, incumbents will concentrate their R&D efforts on 
patenting previous innovations, or alternatively innovation will be targeted towards 
applications and existing assets (Jamasb and Pollit, 2008).  
 
Faced with the threat of competition, firms adopt new strategies according to the 
portfolio of the generation mix and the inherent characteristics of the networks. These 
activities demand a high level of investment in very specific assets with long-term 
amortisation. Generally, the strategies adopted by firms with regard to their investment 
projects are determined by the interaction between market failures and their internal 
resources (Jalivand and Harris, 1984). In this respect, Jalivand and Kim (2012) find, 
from a sample of US firms in the period 1999-2011, that investment in innovation and 
R&D is not considered by utilities to be a strategic investment –not even before reform-, 
in contrast to those in technology-intensive sectors. On the other hand, utilities are 
characterised by their extensive commitment to capital expenditure investment. Slack 
resources have been invested in specific assets –generation technologies and networks-, 
in improvements in the efficiency of functioning technology and in increases in 
productivity. Results by Jalivand and Kim (2012) suggest a trade-off between 
investment in specific assets and investment in R&D and that the firm takes into 
account the opportunity cost of investment in R&D. With the exception of these 
authors, no other contribution offers significant results in attempting to explain the 
possible effects of the financing variable on R&D. Wilder and Stansell (1974) observe, 
previous to reform, that an increase in regulated income did not lead to more investment 
in R&D, in accordance with the Modigiani-Miller theorem. Salies (2010) and 
Sterlacchini (2012) obtain similar results. The volume of profits does not have a 
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significant effect on the investment in R&D carried out by utility firms. On the other 
hand Sanyal (2007) argues that financing does have explanatory power, related to the 
size of the firm. The availability of financial resources is greater in large firms, more 
inclined to finance projects internally whereas small and medium-sized firms tend to 
resort to external financing (Salies, 2010). 
 
The literature distinguishes two types of objectives and projects in energy R&D. The 
first type of R&D and innovation projects is targeted at immediate applications and 
short-term returns and is the most frequently carried out by firms. These projects seek to 
improve the efficiency of the industrial process through incremental innovation or 
enable innovative technological complementarities that in turn may demand new 
organisational strategies and the expansion of markets. R&D in smart grids, smart 
metering and wind and solar energies brings efficiency, greater profitability and short-
term competitive reinforcement. R&D in capturing carbon dioxide emitted by thermal 
power plants also shows the same characteristics as it reinforces the competitiveness of 
a conventional technology. Salies (2010) also includes hybrid or electric vehicles in this 
type of R&D. These innovations are incremental and their effectiveness is measured in 
terms of the improvements in profits within a foreseeable period. In competitive 
conditions, utilities have reoriented their R&D projects with the objective of 
consolidating their competitive position in relation to rival firms (Defeuilly and Furtado, 
2000). 
 
In contrast, another type of projects is one that requires long periods of research and that 
contributes potential disruptive innovations directly focused on climate change 
mitigation –such as fuel cell batteries, tidal turbine systems, storage, and biomass 
gasification (Salies, 2010)-. Some of these projects require large amounts of resources, 
scientific knowledge and the transmission of information between the different phases 
of the industrial process, including the manufacturing of technology. These projects are 
normally classified as scientific applications and are of a non-commercial nature, even 
as precompetitive technology. They require public policy for their implementation and 
public-private partnerships for their development (Newell, 2010; Henderson and 
Newell, 2011). Hence, in a competitive energy market public support is crucial for 
R&D projects focused on climate change mitigation given that they have no possibility 
of being developed privately. 
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3. DATA AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
The empirical analysis is carried out using the Spanish Technological Innovation Panel 
(PITEC) for the period from 2003 to 2010. PITEC is the result of collaboration between 
the Spanish National Statistics Institute and the COTEC foundation aimed at providing 
data from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) that is carried out annually 
following the guidelines of the OECD’s Oslo Manual. The PITEC offers comprehensive 
and detailed information on the characteristics of Spanish firms and their innovative 
activities. While the CIS dataset offers a cross section, the Spanish PITEC overcomes 
this drawback by providing panel data. The dataset provides exhaustive information for 
more than 12,000 firms for the period 2003-2010 and has been frequently used to carry 
out empirical analyses on innovation (Barge-Gil, 2010; De Marchi, 2012).  
 
Although the PITEC has notable advantages it has some limitations as well. One 
limitation is that the level of industry disaggregation is at two digits, making it 
impossible to accurately identify the specific activity of energy companies within the 
whole group of utilities. In Spain, all the gas and electricity companies are privately 
owned whereas almost all water companies are public. Hence, to improve the accuracy 
of the results we have removed firms that were publicly owned from the sample of 
utilities included in PITEC thus restricting the analysis to the private energy sector. 
After this filtering process 462 observations are available for energy companies forming 
an unbalanced panel for the period 2003-2010. 
 
The main characteristics of the firms in the Spanish energy industry (see Table 1 for 
descriptive statistics) show that they are, with an average size of more than 600 
employees, much larger than firms in general. More than half the energy companies 
(59.1%) reported performing R&D activities and the mean R&D effort is 1.8%. 
Although process innovation is much more frequent (65.6%) a substantial proportion of 
firms (39%) has also introduced product innovations. These data show in the same way 
as recent reports on innovation in the energy industry in Spain (Molero, 2012; 
Economics for Energy, 2013) that R&D and innovation levels are, similarly to 
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European countries, low for the size and importance of this sector in the Spanish 
economy. 
 
TABLE 1 
 
The Spanish energy industry is similar to other European countries. When comparing 
the wholesale market position of European countries, Spain is close to the average in 
terms of the number of companies with more than 5% share of generation capacity and 
the share of the three biggest companies. This is also the case when analysing structural 
business indicators such as the firms’ turnover and gross value added per employee or 
the share of personnel costs in production (%) or the investment rates (European 
Commission, 2009b). In addition, the Spanish electric and gas regulations are totally 
harmonised with the European norm. The process of liberalisation and the transposition 
of European energy directives started in 1997. Today, all the transpositions have been 
completed, and this process has been accompanied by the corresponding modifications 
in the domestic laws. Unbundling imposes the absolute separation of ownership of the 
TSO (Transmission System Operator) from the rest of the operators, enforces TPA 
(third party access) to the networks, and establishes competition criteria between all the 
participants (with separation of activities) both in wholesale and retail markets. The 
liberalisation process has reduced the sector's concentration to levels below the EU-27 
average and only transport and distribution networks maintain regulated returns, as the 
European norm establishes. 
 
The model used for the estimation of the determinants of investment in R&D by energy 
companies is based on the structural model proposed by Crepon et al. (1998). This 
model, known as CDM, has been used in numerous empirical analyses (Griffith et al., 
2006). Specifically, we use the first three equations which model the business decisions 
relating to R&D and the knowledge produced as a result of this investment. The first 
equation concerns the firm's dichotomous decision to spend on R&D or not while the 
second corresponds to the intensity of the total R&D effort or R&D investment 
function. Finally, the third equation corresponds to the innovation or knowledge 
production function. Formally: 
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Equations (1) and (2), that are estimated jointly, model the decision to spend on R&D or 
not and the R&D effort according to a set of explanatory variables -(Zit) and (Xit) 
respectively- which are detailed below. Previous empirical analyses modelling R&D 
spending in utilities have also considered that research expenditure decisions are a two-
step process (Sanyal and Cohen, 2009). Although there is no general consensus in the 
literature on how to measure either decisions it is considered that the selection equation 
(1) is a strategic, longer term, to be or not an innovative company, while the second (2) 
is more focused on the short term, in setting annual or multi-annual budgets to be spent 
on R&D (Artés, 2009). 
 
In both equations (1) and (2) we include size, age and public funds as explanatory 
variables. First, firm size is a key variable in any analysis of the determinants of 
investment in R&D or innovation in general (Cohen, 2010). The expected sign of this 
variable is positive, since according to the literature for the sector, larger companies are 
most likely to invest in R&D (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008; Sanyal and Cohen, 2009; 
Salies, 2010), despite the competitive pressures that market liberalization has introduced 
and that would largely relax the Shumpeterian hypotheses. Second, the inclusion of age 
in the models of determinants of R&D is relatively recent, although the literature has 
emphasized the importance of new entrants for innovation and economic growth 
(Baumol et al., 2007). The reason for its omission was the lack of information about age 
in innovation surveys, which however PITEC does offer. Third, numerous studies have 
examined the effects of subsidies on the R&D decisions of firms and, in particular, on 
the possible additionality of public support on private R&D (David et al., 2004). Some 
papers (Callejón and García-Quevedo, 2005) show that the sectoral reaction to R&D 
subsidies is not uniform and that while in some cases a significant additional effect 
occurs, in others the effect is very limited. 
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In the intensity equation (2), we have also considered foreign capital, cooperation with 
other firms and institutions and particularly the variables related to the objectives of 
innovation. Firms may engage in innovation and devote resources to R&D for a number 
of different reasons. With the inclusion of these variables we are able to examine the 
relationship between the different forces that drive innovation activity and R&D 
intensity.  
 
In Technological Innovation Surveys and also in the PITEC, innovative firms are asked 
to report the relevance and the degree of importance of innovation objectives. 
Specifically, objectives oriented to product innovation (expansion of the range of goods 
and services, greater market share) and to process innovation (to increase production 
capacity, reduction of costs per unit of output) are considered. There are also other 
innovation objectives considered in the survey that in the energy sector may become 
relevant. On one hand, those R&D projects aimed at reducing the environmental impact 
of the activity and on the other hand, R&D projects designed to meet environmental 
health and safety regulations. In the estimation of equation (2) each of these objectives 
is measured by a dummy variable indicating whether the firm considers each specific 
factor to be of high importance.  
 
In the third equation, the knowledge production function, we consider total innovation 
(process or product) but we also distinguish between these two different kinds of 
innovation outcome. In the estimations we exclude firms that meet the three following 
conditions: they have not innovated, they do not perceive any obstacle and state that 
they do no need to innovate. With this procedure we follow recent literature on barriers 
and innovation and we consider only firms that are potential innovators, avoiding 
problems of sample selection (Savignac, 2008; D’Este et al., 2012; Blanchard et al., 
2012). The estimations are carried out for the period 2004-2010, instead of 2003-2010, 
because there is no information for the year 2003 on obstacles to innovation in the 
survey.  
 
In these estimations we include the obstacles to innovation in the vector of explanatory 
variables (Wit) with the purpose of examining what type of barriers that may hamper 
innovation are relevant for the energy industry. We control also for the size of the firms 
and we consider whether the firms belong to a group because this may help them to 
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overcome financial barriers more easily in comparison to an independent firm. In 
addition and following the proposal of Griffith et al. (2006) we include the predicted 
value for R&D effort estimated from equation (2). By using this value (R&Dit), as 
explained later, we instrument the R&D effort and take care of possible endogeneity 
problems.  
 
The main barriers considered in the literature are cost, knowledge and market factors. 
The first of these, financial constraints, are related to the characteristics of innovation 
projects like the high degree of uncertainty or the existence of information asymmetries. 
These market failures may explain the existence of financial barriers and particularly 
difficulties in obtaining external funding (Hall, 2002). Other factors, more related with a 
systemic view of innovation, such as the lack of qualified personnel or the lack of 
demand for innovations may also hamper innovation activity (OECD, 2005; D’Este et 
al., 2012; Blanchard et al., 2012). The specific characteristics of R&D activities in the 
energy industry such as the large scale of the projects or incumbent inertia with the 
dominance of existing technologies (Anadon et al., 2011; OECD, 2011) may explain the 
influence of specific factors on the decision to innovate or on the expected results of 
innovation activities.  
 
All the firms, innovative or not, are asked in the PITEC, as in most technological 
innovation surveys, to report the relevance and the degree of importance of some 
specific factors that have hampered innovation activities or influenced the decision not 
to innovate (OECD, 2005). In the estimations we have considered six different factors: 
cost, knowledge, market dominated by established firms, uncertain demand, no need to 
innovate due to prior innovations and no need to innovate because of a lack of demand 
for innovations. Each of these barriers is measured by a dummy variable indicating 
whether the firm considers the specific factor to be of high importance. 
 
In addition to the explanatory variables, in the equations we take into account time-
invariant and unobservable specific firm characteristics and time effects in order to 
control for possible shocks arising from changes in the volatile economic cycle covered 
in the analysis and regulatory changes that have occurred in the sector and that may 
have had an effect on the R&D and innovation behaviour of energy companies as well. 
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4. ESTIMATION, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Most of the empirical work on the estimation of the impact of innovation on 
productivity has relied on the CDM model explained schematically in the previous 
section. This model is essentially a recursive system in which a first block explains both 
the probability of doing R&D and the intensity of the R&D undertaken; and a second 
block analyses the probability of being innovative, and the extent of product and/or 
process innovation. Finally, a third block (not estimated in this paper), uses the 
innovation output and other explanatory variables in order to estimate a productivity 
equation. 
 
Generally, the model is static and unidirectional (productivity does not affect R&D or 
innovation) and it is estimated using cross-section data. These characteristics reflect the 
limitations of the innovation surveys in the majority of countries, where a new sample is 
drawn for each wave, hindering the possibility of any panel data analysis. 
Notwithstanding, this model deals with the endogeneity of R&D in the innovation 
equation and the possible selection bias of the R&D performers. In the original model, 
all equations were estimated jointly by asymptotic least squares, but most subsequent 
studies have relied on a sequential estimation, where the predicted value of the 
endogenous variable in the outcome equation enters as an explanatory variable in the 
following block (equation 3). In this respect, Musolesi and Huiban (2010) show that 
differences in the results derived from sequential instrumental variable estimation and 
maximum likelihood estimation are not important. Hence, the results are rather more 
robust in the estimation method if endogeneity and selection bias are taken into account 
(Mohnen and Hall, 2013). 
 
However, as explained in the previous section as well, we do have a panel of firms. In 
this case, efficiency gains in the estimation are expected since it is possible to take into 
account differences between firms that may be related to variables not included in the 
empirical model. Generally speaking, not controlling for these frequently unobserved 
factors can lead to biased estimates. A standard solution for this problem is the 
estimation of fixed or random effects models for panel data, and it is the approach we 
follow in the estimation. 
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The main challenge in estimating the CDM model relies in the complexity of the first 
block, because of the possible selection bias of R&D performers. Until very recently, 
the estimation of sample selection models with panel data was restricted to static or 
partially dynamic frameworks or relied on semiparametric estimators (Arellano and 
Honoré, 2001; Gayle and Viauroux, 2007). However, Raymond et al. (2007; 2010) have 
proposed a full parametric random-effects dynamic panel data sample selection 
estimator in order to overcome the main difficulties that arise in such a setting, namely 
the presence of unobserved individual effects and the treatment of initial conditions. 
Unfortunately, the small sample of energy firms included in the PITEC and used in this 
paper impedes a full dynamic consideration of the model. In a static framework, the 
initial conditions problem is not an issue and we will not tackle it here. Fortunately, the 
model is flexible enough to nest several different specifications (with or without 
dynamics or sample selection), yet allowing for a more efficient joint estimation of 
parameters. 
 
4.1 Estimation procedure 
 
In order to efficiently estimate the first block of the CDM model, the proposed 
econometric procedure is estimated by Maximum Likelihood and solves the two main 
difficulties referred to before, which are the presence of individual effects and the 
consideration of the initial conditions in a dynamic setting. The method proposes the 
use of random effects, since fixed effects in this case are subject to many shortcomings, 
especially when the panel consists of a large number of individuals (firms) and a small 
number of time observations. For instance, even if a conditional maximum likelihood 
estimator could be used –hence solving the inconsistency problem of estimating a 
potentially large number of dummy variables for individual effects by maximum 
likelihood when the number of periods is small-, this is restrictive in the sense that it is 
normally not possible to concentrate the likelihood with respect to the individual effects 
and, when possible, it works only under the assumption of the strict exogeneity of the 
explanatory variables, ruling out the inclusion of lagged dependent variables as 
explanatory variables (Neyman and Scott, 1948) . 
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More specifically, the first block of the CDM model outlined in the previous section 
consist of equations (1) and (2). Equation (1) is the selection equation that determines 
whether individual i is included in the sample on which the estimation of the equation of 
interest (equation 2) is based, at period t. It is a function of strictly exogenous 
explanatory variables (   ), time-invariant unobserved individual effects (  ), and other 
time-variant unobserved variables (    ). In a dynamic specification, we could also 
include the past selection outcome (      ). The vector  
  captures the effects of the 
explanatory variables on the current selection process, and is to be estimated. The 
equation of interest depends on strictly exogenous explanatory variables (   ), time-
invariant unobserved individual effects (  ), and other time-variant unobserved 
variables (    ), and is observed only when     is positive. As in the previous case, in a 
dynamic setting we would include its past outcome (        ). The vector  
  captures 
the effects of explanatory variables on current outcome, and is to be estimated as well. 
In this case, since a fully parametric approach is designed for the estimation of this first 
block of the CDM model, there is no need for exclusion restrictions in the vector of 
strictly exogenous explanatory variables, making it possible that     and     are the 
same, totally different or that they have common explanatory variables. 
 
For the purpose of estimation, the individual effects are assumed, in every period, to be 
linear in the strictly exogenous explanatory variables (and in the initial conditions in the 
case of dynamic specifications), i.e. 
 
     
    
       
         
     
    
         
         
 
where   
  (   
       
 ),   
  (   
       
 ),   
 ,   
 ,   
  ,   
 ,   
 ,    
   are to be 
estimated, and     and     are independent of (      ) and (        ) respectively. 
The scalars   
  and   
  capture the dependence of the individual effects on the initial 
conditions. The vectors (         )  and (       )  are assumed to be independent of 
each other, and independently and identically distributed over time and across 
individuals following a normal distribution with mean zero and covariance matrices 
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respectively. The parameters of the covariance matrices are also to be estimated. Hence, 
the likelihood function of individual i, starting from t=1 and conditional on the 
regressors and the initial conditions, is written as 
 
   ∬ ∏    (         |                                       ) (       )        
 
   
 
  
 (4) 
 
where ∏    (         |                                       )
 
    and  (       ) 
denote respectively the likelihood function of individual i conditional on the individual 
effects, and the bivariate normal density function of (       ). With some 
transformations (please refer to Raymond et al., 2007 for details), the double integral in 
equation (4) can be approximated by a "two-step" Gauss-Hermite quadrature so that the 
random effects individual likelihood function of the type 2 tobit model becomes a 
function of the weights and abscissas of the first and second step of the numerical 
approximation of the likelihood function. Hence, the product over i of the resultant 
approximate likelihood function can be maximised using standard numerical procedures 
to obtain the desired estimates of the parameters of the model (see Raymond et al. 2007 
and 2010 for technical details about the procedure). 
 
To summarize, the proposed model assumes that the individual effects are, in every 
period, linear in the strictly exogenous explanatory variables (and the initial conditions 
in the case of a dynamic specification). Hence, the likelihood function of a given 
individual starting at the initial period and conditional on the regressors (and the initial 
conditions if taking into account dynamics) is a function of the likelihood function of 
that individual conditional on the individual effects and a bivariate normal density 
function of cross-equation individual effects. Hence, the individual effects are 
"integrated-out" with respect to their joint normal distribution. The resulting likelihood 
function covers a wide range of likelihood functions of panel data models whose 
estimation can be done by simply making restriction assumptions on the parameters of 
the dynamic panel data sample selection model just described and can be tested using 
standard likelihood ratio or Wald tests. For instance, in our model, since the limited 
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sample of energy firms included in the PITEC database does not allow us to specify a 
fully dynamic model (the algorithm simply does not converge) we restrict the analysis 
to the static case, but we take into account both sample selection and individual effects 
in the estimates. 
 
In our case, equations (1) and (2) –the first block of the CDM model where we analyse 
the drivers of R&D (characteristics of the firms and reasons to engage in innovation)-, 
are jointly estimated using this relatively novel estimator to control for selection bias 
and unobserved heterogeneity. In these estimations we include the main characteristics 
such as size, age, public support, cooperation and foreign capital that, following the 
literature, are related to the decision to do R&D and to the effort. We also include the 
variables that capture the reasons to innovate or objectives (oriented to product 
innovation, oriented to process innovation, reducing environmental impact and to meet 
regulations).  
 
The third equation, where we examine the effect of the different obstacles to innovation, 
-the second block of the CDM model- is estimated using a random effects probit model 
defined as follows: 
 
     
                  
      {
          
   
           
 
 
where      
  is the unobservable variable,       is the observed outcome,       is the 
predicted value of the outcome equation (2),     is the observed vector of exogenous 
characteristics which influence      
 ,   and   are parameters to be estimated. 
Furthermore, we can decompose the error term into two parts: 
 
           
 
here the     denote individual specific unobservable effects, assuming that    ~ 
N(    
 ) and     is the iid N(0,1) random error. From this specification we know that 
 
   (   )      
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The common error component    means that, within individuals, the     will be 
correlated by a magnitude 
 
  
  
 
     
 
 
Since the realizations of       are correlated, the common    mean that the Ti 
observations on individual i are distributed according to a T-variate normal distribution, 
making the likelihood function really complicated. However, Butler and Moffitt (1982) 
showed that, because the dependence in the     is completely due to the common 
variation in the     , we can eliminate the higher order integrals by conditioning on the 
  , and integrate them out of the likelihood. This approach limits us to evaluating one-
dimensional integrals, again by means of the Gauss-Hermite quadrature approximation. 
 
In this specification, and in order to avoid some potential endogeneity problems, the 
vector of exogenous characteristics includes the predicted value for the firms’ R&D 
effort taken from the previous estimations. We also include the size of the firms and the 
barriers that may hamper innovation. We consider barriers related to costs, knowledge, 
market and reasons for not innovating. 
 
4.2 Results and discussion 
 
With the estimation for the R&D equations with the use of a sample selection model we 
examine the effects of the explanatory variables on the decision to engage or not in 
R&D and on the amount of R&D expenditure. The results (Table 2) show, first, that 
size is a determining factor for performing R&D but not for R&D intensity. Once they 
carry out R&D activities, smaller companies devote more resources to R&D (in relative 
terms). The empirical analyses of electric utilities have shown that there is a positive 
and significant effect of the size of the firms on R&D expenditure (Jamasb and Pollit, 
2008). In particular, the econometric estimations that have taken into account the 
existence of sample selection (Sanyal and Cohen, 2009; Salies, 2010, Kim et al., 2012) 
have always found a positive and significant relationship between size and engaging in 
R&D. Our results point out in the same direction showing that there is a critical scale to 
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obtain profits from R&D investments in the energy industry. However, the results on 
the elasticity of R&D expenditure with respect to size vary significantly in the empirical 
analyses from values greater than 1 to values less than 1, or even not significant 
(Sterlacchini, 2102). 
 
Second, younger firms are more likely to devote more resources to R&D activities, 
although they do not necessarily engage more than older firms in the long-run decision 
to perform R&D. Competition has implied more entry either thorough unbundling or by 
new entrants and younger firms are among the more intense R&D performers. Third, 
public support has a positive influence on the decision to perform R&D but not on the 
intensity.  
 
Finally, the energy firms that claim that process innovation is of great importance are 
those that devote resources to technological activities with greater intensity. The other 
innovation objectives have no impact on R&D intensity. These results are consistent 
with several contributions discussed in section 2. In a liberalised energy market, 
competition forces firms to search for higher margins by means of enhanced productive 
efficiency, thus embracing process innovations. Competition results in a reorientation of 
research investment towards short-term objectives and focuses on applied R&D with the 
aim of increasing efficiency and profit margins (Defeuilly and Furtado, 2000; Jamasb 
and Pollit, 2008; Salies, 2010). 
 
TABLE 2 
 
The estimations for the innovation equation (Table 3) show, as expected, that the main 
control variables –size and the estimated R&D intensity (resulting from the estimated 
parameters of the model in Table 2)- have positive and highly significant effects on the 
probability of introducing innovations. The results for the energy industry also show 
that financial and knowledge obstacles are not important barriers hampering innovation, 
in contrast to the analyses carried out for firms in general (Mohnen et al., 2008; 
Savignac, 2008; Blanchard et al., 2012). While empirical evidence has stressed that 
firms face financial obstacles to innovation activities (Hall, 2002; Blanchard et al., 
2012; Popp and Newell, 2012), our results suggest, in the same way as Salies (2010), 
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that firms in the energy industry seem not to be subject, even after the liberalisation 
reforms, to financial constraints in carrying out their innovative projects. 
 
TABLE 3 
 
Firms in the energy sector that perceive that the market is dominated by established 
firms have a lower probability of introducing innovations. The estimations show that the 
parameter is negative and significant confirming the dominance of existing technologies 
and the incumbent inertia of the energy system. Despite the liberalisation reforms and 
the current competitive situation, our results show that incumbents and existing 
technologies in the industry are hampering innovative projects with alternative 
technologies. These results suggest, as pointed out in section two, that the technology 
mix of the country may be an entry barrier when incumbent firms concentrate their 
portfolio on traditional energy technologies.  
 
For the other market obstacle, the uncertainty of the demand, the parameter is 
significant and positive. Nevertheless, this only holds for product and not for process 
innovation. Therefore there is a positive relationship between the firms that state that 
demand uncertainty is a significant obstacle and the most innovative firms, in terms of 
new products, showing that although they face this obstacle, it does not hamper their 
innovation activities. These kinds of innovation are mainly related to the liberalisation 
process and increasing competition in the retail energy markets, where suppliers are 
offering more innovative goods, and particularly services, to consumers. In liberalised 
markets, characterised by the existence of greater uncertainties than in monopoly 
conditions, new players have entered. The supplier companies, with more freedom to 
design products and prices, are developing a variety of new, more customer oriented, 
energy services (Markard and Truffer, 2006). Competition in the residential electricity 
markets tends to be initiated by a few smaller players who offer innovation and over 
time incumbent firms, that present quite considerable initial resistance, also deliver 
more innovative services to customers (Littlechild, 2006; Markard and Truffer, 2006).  
 
Finally, the parameter corresponding to no need to innovate due to prior innovations is 
also significant reinforcing the conclusion that the dominance of existing technologies is 
hampering innovation in the energy industry, specifically in the case of process 
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innovations. Even if liberalisation has brought about more competition and this in turn 
has transformed the structure of the energy sector by altering the number and average 
size of participating firms, by renewing the technologies for generation as well as 
introducing increased rivalry in retail, the main barriers hindering innovation in the 
sector are related to the perception of incumbent dominance in the energy market.  
 
For the estimations of the innovation production functions, we have performed some 
robustness checks to take into account some discussions on the literature on R&D and 
innovation. Firstly, R&D investments may require some time to have an effect on 
innovation in processes and products. Therefore, we switched the predicted R&D effort 
from the first block, that considers a contemporaneous correlation between R&D effort 
and innovation outcomes, to the corresponding lagged value (t-2). In this case, the 
results are consistent with the previous ones. Secondly, in order to account for possible 
systematic correlations between decisions to perform product and process innovations 
(Martínez-Ros and Labeaga, 2009), we estimate a bivariate probit model with binary 
equations for each outcome. In this case, the only possibility of carrying out the 
estimations is to use pooled data. Hence we are not able to control for individual effects 
in these estimations. The results from our first estimation are also confirmed and show 
the relevance of market obstacles to innovation and the differences regarding process or 
product innovation. The estimate for the cross equation correlation is positive, 
indicating complementarities between the two decisions.  
 
TABLES 4 and 5 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
 
There is a broad consensus on the convenience of the energy industry devoting more 
resources to R&D and innovation. To meet the challenge related to climate change 
requires a significant increase in energy innovation. Nevertheless, the levels of R&D 
and innovation of the energy sector after the liberalisation reforms started in the 1990s, 
and currently, remain quite low in comparison with the importance of this sector in the 
economy.  
 
22
 
 
The objective of this paper has been to improve our understanding of the reasons that 
explain R&D investment and innovation in the energy sector. Putting together two 
strands of the literature on the determinants of innovation, we have analysed the 
influence of the characteristics of the firms and the objectives of innovation on R&D 
decisions and effort and, particularly, what barriers are hampering innovation in this 
sector.  
 
The econometric analysis has been carried using panel data for the period 2003-2010 
and the main conclusions from the estimations regarding R&D drivers and obstacles to 
innovation in the energy industry are the following ones. Firstly, our joint estimations 
for the decision to spend on R&D or not and the R&D effort show, consistently with the 
literature, that size is a barrier to entry for R&D in the energy sector. Nevertheless, there 
is not a positive relationship between size and R&D intensity. Once they carry out 
R&D, smaller companies make a greater effort in R&D, measured in relative terms with 
respect to sales. Secondly, R&D intensity is particularly related to innovation objectives 
oriented to process innovation likely to increase efficiency through a reduction of costs 
or to an increase in production capacity. For the rest of the innovation objectives, 
including the reduction of environmental impact, none of the parameters are significant. 
 
The estimations of the innovation production function provide the main conclusions of 
the paper regarding the obstacles to innovation. Firstly, our results show that the main 
barrier hampering innovation activities in the energy industry is the market dominance 
of established firms. This conclusion is reinforced by the estimates that show that there 
is a prevalence of dominant technologies that have a negative effect on the decision to 
innovate in new processes and therefore hamper the introduction of new energy 
technologies. Secondly, the estimations for product innovations show that although the 
most innovative firms state that they are facing an uncertain demand for innovative 
goods and particularly services, this obstacle is not hampering their innovative 
activities. Thirdly, and in contrast to the results of the literature for other industries, 
financial constraints are not a significant obstacle to innovation in the energy industry.  
 
The analysis of R&D drivers and obstacles to innovation has been carried out for the 
energy supply industry. However, other industries, such as component suppliers, the 
machinery industry or transport equipment, also play an important role in energy 
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innovation. To include these sectors in the analysis would require further research and 
enough information to be able to differentiate their R&D and innovative activities 
related with energy from those not related to this sector. In the analysis carried out it 
should be also taken into account that the available information does not allow 
differentiation between the firms that perform their activity in the absolutely liberalised 
segments of the energy market from those in segments where some regulation exists. To 
distinguish between these types of firms would allow an analysis of whether there are 
some differences in their R&D and innovative behaviour.  
 
Finally, the results have some policy implications regarding how to increase R&D 
efforts and innovation in the energy sector. The general rationale for policy support to 
R&D and innovation is the existence of market failures. Together with this justification 
for policy action, our results show there are important barriers particular to the energy 
industry related to the dominance of established firms in the market and the existing 
technologies that hamper innovation efforts significantly. To confront this situation it 
would be convenient to introduce changes in the regulation of the sector in order to 
foster innovation projects and to increase public efforts oriented towards long-term 
goals. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
R&D decision 
Dummy = 1 if the firm has 
performed R&D activities 
462 0.591 0.492 0 1 
R&D effort R&D expenditure over sales 462 1.8 7.7 0 88.0 
R&D effort estimated 
R&D effort estimated with 
results from model in table 1 
462 0.794 1.6 0 22.0 
Size Number of employees 462 
612.0 1090.8 1 7900 
Age 
Years the firm has been 
operating in the market 
362 30.8 33.2 0 110 
Public funds 
Dummy = 1 if the firm 
received an R&D subsidy 
416 0.413 0.493 0 1 
Foreign capital 
Dummy = 1 if the firm is 
partially owned by foreign 
investors 
462 0.154 0.361 0 1 
Cooperation 
Dummy = 1 if the firm 
cooperates in innovation 
380 0.574 0.495 0 1 
Group 
Dummy = 1 if the firm 
belongs to a group of firms 
410 0.654 0.476 0 1 
Objective: Product 
Dummy = 1 if the firm 
considers the objective of 
high importance 
334 0.189 0.392 0 1 
Objective: Process 
Dummy = 1 if the firm 
considers the objective of 
high importance 
334 0.204 0.403 0 1 
Objective: Environment 
Dummy = 1 if the firm 
considers the objective of 
high importance 
334 0.380 0.486 0 1 
Objective: Norms 
Dummy = 1 if the firm 
considers the objective of 
high importance 
334 0.308 0.463 0 1 
Total innovation 
Dummy = 1 if the firm has 
performed either product or 
process innovation 
410 0.739 0.440 0 1 
Process innovation 
Dummy = 1 if the firm has 
performed process 
innovation 
410 0.656 0.476 0 1 
Product innovation 
Dummy = 1 if the firm has 
performed product 
innovation 
410 0.390 0.488 0 1 
Cost barriers 
Dummy = 1 if the firm 
considers the barrier to be of 
high importance  
410 0.066 0.248 0 1 
Knowledge barriers 
Dummy = 1 if the firm 
considers the barrier to be of 
high importance  
410 0.005 0.070 0 1 
Market: Incumbents 
Dummy = 1 if the firm 
considers the barrier to be of 
high importance  
410 0.095 0.294 0 1 
Market: Demand  
uncertainty 
Dummy = 1 if the firm 
considers the barrier to be of 
high importance 
410 0.090 0.287 0 1 
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Motives: Previous  
innovations 
Dummy = 1 if the firm 
considers the barrier to be of 
high importance  
410 0.032 0.175 0 1 
Motives: No demand 
 for innovations 
Dummy = 1 if the firm 
considers the barrier to be of 
high importance  
410 0.110 0.313 0 1 
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Table 2. R&D equation (decision and intensity) 
  
 R&D R&D 
 Intensity decision 
   
Size -0.780*** 0.412** 
 (0.123) (0.202) 
Age -0.0116*** -0.00164 
 (0.00410) (0.00505) 
Public funds 0.214 2.739*** 
 (0.430) (0.582) 
Foreign capital -0.101 -0.956 
 (0.341) (0.697) 
Cooperation -0.0418  
 (0.372)  
Objectives:   
     Product innovation -0.524  
 (0.449)  
     Process innovation 1.392***  
 (0.387)  
     Environmental impact 0.166  
 (0.408)  
     Norms and regulations 0.214  
 (0.472)  
Constant 4.393*** -2.403** 
 (0.816) (1.003) 
   
Observations 273 462 
Tests of sample selection and individual effects: 
 
      0.179 (0.270) 
      -0.428 (0.384) 
    -0.168 (0.373) 
    0.415*** (0.112) 
    0.0560 (0.099) 
   
Note: All regressions include time dummies to control for year-specific effects. Standard errors in 
parentheses and *** denotes significant at 1%, ** denotes significant at 5% and * denotes significant at 
10%. 
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Table 3. Innovation production functions 
 Innovation: 
 Total Process Product 
    
Size 0.554*** 0.588*** 0.244* 
 (0.167) (0.160) (0.127) 
R&D effort 1.396*** 1.501*** 0.512** 
 (0.313) (0.310) (0.214) 
Group 0.589 0.358 0.316 
 (0.441) (0.455) (0.425) 
    
Barriers:    
Cost 0.167 0.201 -0.324 
 (0.516) (0.513) (0.432) 
Knowledge -0.649 0.133 1.110 
 (2.847) (2.490) (1.501) 
Market:    
Incumbents -1.530** -1.120* -0.751 
 (0.620) (0.610) (0.560) 
Demand uncertainty 1.686** 0.615 1.557*** 
 (0.763) (0.639) (0.485) 
Motives for not innovating:    
Previous innovations -1.990** -1.555* -0.189 
 (0.943) (0.902) (0.760) 
No demand for innovation -0.144 -0.192 -0.674 
 (0.498) (0.487) (0.484) 
    
Constant -2.987*** -3.833*** -2.709*** 
 (0.895) (0.927) (0.767) 
    
  0.742* 0.757* 0.759* 
 (0.095) (0.079) (0.066) 
Log-likelihood -140.6 -161.3 -199.0 
chi2 31.68 35.81 24.66 
Prob(chi2) 0.00711 0.00189 0.0547 
    
Observations 410 
  
Note: All regressions include time dummies to control for year-specific effects. Standard errors in 
parentheses and *** denotes significant at 1%, ** denotes significant at 5% and * denotes significant at 
10%. 
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Table 4. Robustness check for Innovation production functions–lag predicted 
R&D effort 
 Innovation: 
 Total Process Product 
    
Size 0.426** 0.384** 0.384* 
 (0.181) (0.169) (0.215) 
Lagged R&D effort (t-2) 0.685** 0.743** 0.319 
 (0.303) (0.299) (0.354) 
Group 1.423** 1.051 0.224 
 (0.682) (0.650) (0.735) 
    
Barriers:    
Cost -0.211 -0.416 -0.492 
 (0.615) (0.583) (0.581) 
Knowledge 1.119 1.117 3.496 
 (4.331) (3.675) (2.250) 
Market:    
Incumbents -1.578** -1.296* -1.717* 
 (0.749) (0.733) (0.893) 
Demand uncertainty 0.605 0.429 1.566** 
 (0.778) (0.734) (0.791) 
Motives for not innovating:    
Previous innovations -3.008* -2.651* -0.614 
 (1.645) (1.543) (1.935) 
No demand for innovation -0.249 -0.141 -0.851 
 (0.649) (0.601) (0.785) 
    
Constant -1.108 -1.134 -2.505** 
 (0.968) (0.922) (1.177) 
    
  1.145** 1.146** 1.760*** 
 (0.527) (0.480) (0.463) 
Log-likelihood -88.02 -108.0 -133.3 
chi2 21.94 23.58 20.32 
Prob(chi2) 0.0799 0.0515 0.120 
    
Observations 294 294 294 
    
Note: All regressions include time dummies to control for year-specific effects. Standard errors in 
parentheses and *** denotes significant at 1%, ** denotes significant at 5% and * denotes significant at 
10%. 
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Table 5. Robustness for Innovation production functions – bivariate probit 
 Innovation: 
 Process Product 
   
Size 0.313*** 0.0721 
 (0.0526) (0.0458) 
R&D effort 1.000*** 0.166 
 (0.177) (0.123) 
Group 0.250 0.429*** 
 (0.177) (0.163) 
   
Barriers: 0.453 -0.0436 
Cost (0.356) (0.297) 
 -0.890 -0.176 
Knowledge (0.636) (0.728) 
   
Market:   
Incumbents -0.896*** -0.574** 
 (0.280) (0.256) 
Demand uncertainty 0.260 0.914*** 
 (0.295) (0.267) 
Motives for not innovating:   
Previous innovations -0.756* -0.552 
 (0.438) (0.469) 
No demand for innovation -0.300 -0.244 
 (0.280) (0.241) 
   
Constant -1.909*** -1.232*** 
 (0.366) (0.337) 
   
  0.218** 
 (0.0985) 
   
Note: All regressions include time dummies to control for year-specific effects. Standard errors in 
parentheses and *** denotes significant at 1%, ** denotes significant at 5% and * denotes significant at 
10%. In the bivariate probit (assuming normality of the error terms) the correlation parameter ρ provide 
information about the covariation of the error terms. 
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